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Abstract
Modern architectures rely on memory fences to prevent undesired weakenings of memory consistency.
As the fences’ semantics may be subtle, the automation of their placement is highly desirable. But
precise methods for restoring consistency do not scale to deployed systems code. We choose to trade
some precision for genuine scalability: our technique is suitable for large code bases. We implement it
in our new musketeer tool, and detail experiments on more than 350 executables of packages found in
Debian Linux 7.1, e.g. memcached (about 10000 LoC).
1 Introduction
Concurrent programs are hard to design and implement, especially when running on multiprocessor archi-
tectures. Multiprocessors implement weak memory models, which feature e.g. instruction reordering, store
buffering (both appearing on x86), or store atomicity relaxation (a particularity of Power and ARM). Hence,
multiprocessors allow more behaviours than Lamport’s Sequential Consistency (SC) [Lam79], a theoretical
model where the execution of a program corresponds to an interleaving of the different threads. This has a
dramatic effect on programmers, most of whom learned to program with SC.
Fortunately, architectures provide special fence (or barrier) instructions to prevent certain behaviours.
Yet both the questions of where and how to insert fences are contentious, as fences are architecture-specific
and expensive.
Attempts at automatically placing fences include Visual Studio 2013, which offers an option to guarantee
acquire/release semantics (we study the performance impact of this policy in Sec. 2). The C++11 standard
provides an elaborate API for inter-thread communication, giving the programmer some control over which
fences are used, and where. But the use of such APIs might be a hard task, even for expert programmers.
For example, Norris and Demsky reported a bug found in a published C11 implementation of a work-stealing
queue [ND13].
We address here the question of how to synthesise fences, i.e. automatically place them in a program
to enforce robustness/stability [BMM11, AM11] (which implies SC). This should lighten the programmer’s
burden. The fence synthesis tool needs to be based on a precise model of weak memory. In verification,
models commonly adopt an operational style, where an execution is an interleaving of transitions accessing
the memory (as in SC). To address weaker architectures, the models are augmented with buffers and queues
that implement the features of the hardware. Similarly, a good fraction of the fence synthesis methods,
e.g. [LW13, KVY10, KVY11, LNP+12, AAC+13, BDM13] (see also Fig. 3), rely on operational models to
describe executions of programs.
Challenges Thus, methods using operational models inherit the limitations of methods based on inter-
leavings, e.g. the “severely limited scalability”, as [LNP+12] puts it. Indeed, none of them scale to programs
with more than a few hundred lines of code, due to the very large number of executions a program can have.
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Another impediment to scalability is that these methods establish if there is a need for fences by exploring
the executions of a program one by one.
Finally, considering models a` la Power makes the problem significantly more difficult. Intel x86 offers
only one fence (mfence), but Power offers a variety of synchronisation: fences (e.g. sync and lwsync), or
dependencies (address, data or control). This diversity makes the optimisation more subtle: one cannot
simply minimise the number of fences, but rather has to consider the costs of the different synchronisation
mechanisms; it might be cheaper to use one full fence than four dependencies.
Our approach We tackle these challenges with a static approach. Our choice of model almost mandates
this approach: we rely on the axiomatic semantics of [AMSS10]. We feel that an axiomatic semantics is an
invitation to build abstract objects that embrace all the executions of a program.
Previous works, e.g. [SS88, AM11, BMM11, BDM13], show that weak memory behaviours boil down
to the presence of certain cycles, called critical cycles, in the executions of the program. A critical cycle
essentially represents a minimal violation of SC, and thus indicates where to place fences to restore SC. We
detect these cycles statically, by exploring an over-approximation of the executions of the program.
Contributions Our method is sound for a wide range of architectures, including x86-TSO, Power and
ARM; and scales for large code bases, such as memcached (about 10000 LoC). We implemented it in our
new musketeer tool. Our method is the most precise of the static analysis methods (see Sec. 2). To do this
comparison, we implemented all these methods in our tool; for example, the pensieve policy [SFW+05] was
designed for Java only, and we now provide it for x86-TSO, Power and ARM. Thus, our tool musketeer gives
a comparison point for the field.
Outline We discuss the performance impact of fences in Sec. 2, and survey related work in Sec. 3. We
recall our weak memory semantics in Sec. 4. We detail how we detect critical cycles in Sec. 5, and how we
place fences in Sec. 6. In Sec. 7, we compare existing tools and our new tool musketeer. We provide the
sources, benchmarks and experimental reports online at http://www.cprover.org/wmm/musketeer.
2 Motivation
Before optimising the placement of fences, we investigated whether naive approaches to fence insertion indeed
have a negative performance impact. To that end, we measured the overhead of different fencing methods
on a stack and a queue from the liblfds lock-free data structure package (http://liblfds.org). For each data
structure, we built a harness (consisting of 4 threads) that concurrently invokes its operations. We built
several versions of the above two programs:
• (m) with fences inserted by our tool musketeer;
• (p) with fences following the delay set analysis of the pensieve compiler [SFW+05], i.e. a static over-
approximation of Shasha and Snir’s eponymous (dynamic) analysis [SS88] (see also the discussion of
Lee and Padua’s work [LP01] in Sec. 3);
• (v) with fences following the Visual Studio policy, i.e. guaranteeing acquire/release semantics (in the
C11 sense [c1111]), but not SC, for reads and writes of volatile variables (see http://msdn.microsoft.
com/en-us/library/vstudio/jj635841.aspx, accessed 04-11-2013). On x86, no fences are necessary as the
model is sufficiently strong already; hence, we only provide data for ARM;
• (e) with fences after each access to a shared variable;
• (h) with an mfence (x86) or a dmb (ARM) after every assembly instruction that writes (x86) or reads
or writes (ARM) static global or heap data.
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Fig. 1: Overheads for the different fencing strategies
We emphasise that these experiments required us to implement (P), (E) and (V) ourselves, so that they
would handle the architectures that we considered. This means in particular that our tool provides the
pensieve policy (P) for TSO, Power and ARM, whereas the original pensieve targeted Java only.
We ran all versions 100 times, on an x86-64 Intel Core i5-3570 with 4 cores (3.40GHz) and 4GB of RAM,
and on an ARMv7 (32-bit) Samsung Exynos 4412 with 4 cores (1.6GHz) and 2GB of RAM.
For each program version, Fig. 1 shows the mean overhead w.r.t. the unfenced program. We give the
overhead (in %) in user time (as given by Linux time), i.e. the time spent by the program in user mode on
the CPU. Amongst the approaches that guarantee SC (i.e. all but v), the best results were achieved with
our tool musketeer.
We checked the statistical significance of the execution time improvement of our method over the existing
methods by computing and comparing the confidence intervals for a sample size of N = 100 and a confidence
level 1−α = 95% in Fig. 19. If the confidence intervals for two methods are non-overlapping, we can conclude
that the difference between the means is statistically significant.
3 Related work
The work of Shasha and Snir [SS88] is a foundation for the field of fence synthesis. Most of the work cited
below inherits their notions of delay and critical cycle. A delay is a pair of instructions in a thread that can
be reordered by the underlying architecture. A critical cycle essentially represents a minimal violation of SC.
Fig. 3 classifies the methods mentioned in this section w.r.t. their style of model (operational or axiomatic).
We report our experimental comparison of these tools in Sec. 7. Below, we detail fence synthesis methods
per style. We write TSO for Total Store Order, implemented in Sparc TSO [spa94] and Intel x86 [OSS09].
We write PSO for Partial Store Order and RMO for Relaxed Memory Order, two other Sparc architectures.
We write Power for IBM Power [ppc09].
Operational models Linden and Wolper [LW13] explore all executions (using what they call automata
acceleration) to simulate the reorderings occuring under TSO and PSO. Abdulla et al. [AAC+13] couple
predicate abstraction for TSO with a counterexample-guided strategy. They check if an error state is
reachable; if so, they calculate what they call the maximal permissive sets of fences that forbid this error
state. Their method guarantees that the fences they find are necessary, i.e., removing a fence from the set
would make the error state reachable again.
stack on x86 stack on ARM queue on x86 queue on ARM
(o) [9.757; 9.798] [11.291; 11.369] [11.947; 11.978] [20.441; 20.634]
(m) [9.818; 9.850] [11.316; 11.408] [12.067; 12.099] [20.687; 20.857]
(p) [10.077; 10.155] [11.995; 12.109] [13.339; 13.373] [22.035; 22.240]
(v) N/A [11.779; 11.834] N/A [21.334; 21.526]
(e) [11.316; 11.360] [13.071; 13.200] [13.949, 13.981] [22.722; 22.903]
(h) [12.286; 12.325] [14.676; 14.844] [14.941, 14.963] [25.468; 25.633]
Fig. 2: Confidence intervals for data structure experiments.
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authors tool model style objective
Abdulla et al. [AAC+13] memorax operational reachability
Alglave et al. [AMSS10] offence axiomatic SC
Bouajjani et al. [BDM13] trencher operational SC
Fang et al. [FLM03] pensieve axiomatic SC
Kuperstein et al. [KVY10] fender operational reachability
Kuperstein et al. [KVY11] blender operational reachability
Linden et al. [LW13] remmex operational reachability
Liu et al. [LNP+12] dfence operational specification
Sura et al. [SFW+05] pensieve axiomatic SC
Fig. 3: Fence synthesis tools
Kuperstein et al. [KVY10] explore all executions for TSO, PSO and a subset of RMO, and along the
way build constraints encoding reorderings leading to error states. The fences can be derived from the set
of constraints at the error states. The same authors [KVY11] improve this exploration under TSO and
PSO using an abstract interpretation they call partial coherence abstraction, relaxing the order in the write
buffers after a certain bound, thus reducing the state space to explore. Liu et al. [LNP+12] offer a dynamic
synthesis approach for TSO and PSO, enumerating the possible sets of fences to prevent an execution picked
dynamically from reaching an error state.
Bouajjani et al. [BDM13] build on an operational model of TSO. They look for minimum violations (viz.
critical cycles) by enumerating attackers (viz. delays). Like us, they use linear programming. However, they
first enumerate all the solutions, then encode them as an ILP, and finally ask the solver to pick the least
expensive one. Our method directly encodes the whole decision problem as an ILP. The solver thus both
constructs the solution (avoiding the exponential-size ILP problem) and ensures its optimality.
All the approaches above focus on TSO and its siblings PSO and RMO, whereas we also handle the
significantly weaker Power, including quite subtle barriers (e.g. lwsync) compared to the simpler mfence of
x86.
Axiomatic models Krishnamurthy et al. [KY96] apply Shasha and Snir’s method to single program
multiple data systems. Their abstraction is similar to ours, except that they do not handle pointers.
Lee and Padua [LP01] propose an algorithm based on Shasha and Snir’s work. They use dominat-
ors in graphs to determine which fences are redundant. This approach was later implemented by Fang et
al. [FLM03] in pensieve, a compiler for Java. Sura et al. later implemented a more precise approach in pen-
sieve [SFW+05] (see (p) in Sec. 2). They pair the cycle detection with an analysis to detect synchronisation
that could prevent cycles.
Alglave and Maranget [AMSS10] revisit Shasha and Snir for contemporary memory models and insert
fences following a refinement of [LP01]. Their offence tool handles snippets of assembly code only, where the
memory locations need to be explicitly given.
Others We cite the work of Vafeiadis and Zappa Nardelli [VZN11], who present an optimisation of the
certified CompCert-TSO compiler to remove redundant fences on TSO. Marino et al. [MSM+11] experiment
with an SC-preserving compiler, showing overheads of no more than 34%. Nevertheless, they emphasise
that “the overheads, however small, might be unacceptable for certain applications”.
4 Axiomatic memory model
Weak memory can occur as follows: a thread sends a write to a store buffer, then a cache, and finally to
memory. While the write transits through buffers and caches, a read can occur before the value is available
to all threads in memory.
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mp
T0 T1
(a) x← 1 (c) r1← y
(b) y← 1 (d) r2← x
Final state? r1=1 ∧ r2=0
(a) Wx1
(b) Wy1
(c) Ry1
(d) Rx0
po
rf
po
fr
Fig. 4: Message Passing (mp)
To describe such situations, we use the framework
of [AMSS10], embracing in particular SC, Sun TSO (i.e. the
x86 model [OSS09]), and a fragment of Power. The core of this
framework consists of relations over memory events.
We illustrate this framework using a litmus test (Fig. 4).
The top shows a multi-threaded program. The shared variables
x and y are assumed to be initialised to zero. A store instruc-
tion (e.g. x ← 1 on T0) gives rise to a write event ((a)Wx1),
and a load instruction (e.g. r1 ← y on T1) to a read event
((c)Ry1). The bottom of Fig. 4 shows one particular execution
of the program (also called event graph), corresponding to the
final state r1=1 and r2=0.
In the framework of [AMSS10], an execution that is not
possible on SC has a cyclic event graph (as the one shown in Fig. 4). A weaker architecture may relax some
of the relations contributing to a cycle. If the removal of the relaxed edges from the event graph makes it
acyclic, the architecture allows the execution. For example, Power relaxes the program order po (amongst
other things), thereby making the graph in Fig. 4 acyclic. Hence, the given execution is allowed on Power.
Formalisation An event is a memory read or a write to memory, composed of a unique identifier, a
direction (R for read or W for write), a memory address, and a value. We represent each instruction by the
events it issues. In Fig. 4, we associate the store instruction x← 1 in thread T0 with the event (a)Wx1.
A set of events E and their program order po form an event structure E , (E, po). The program order
po is a per-thread total order over E. We write dp (with dp ⊆ po) for the relation that models dependencies
between instructions. For instance, there is a data dependency between a load and a store when the value
written by the store was computed from the value obtained by the load.
We represent the communication between threads via an execution witness X , (co, rf), which consists
of two relations over the events. First, the coherence co is a per-address total order on write events which
models the memory coherence widely assumed by modern architectures. It links a write w to any write w′
to the same address that hits the memory after w. Second, the read-from relation rf links a write w to a
read r such that r reads the value written by w. Finally, we derive the from-read relation fr from co and rf.
A read r is in fr with a write w if the write w′ from which r reads hits the memory before w. Formally, we
have: (r, w) ∈ fr , ∃w′.(w′, r) ∈ rf ∧ (w′, w) ∈ co.
In Fig. 4, the specified outcome corresponds to the execution below if each location initially holds 0. If
r1=1 in the end, the read (c) on T1 took its value from the write (b) on T0, hence (b, c) ∈ rf. If r2=0 in the
end, the read (d) took its value from the initial state, thus before the write (a) on T0, hence (d, a) ∈ fr. In
the following, we write rfe (resp. coe, fre) for the external read-from (resp. coherence, from-read), i.e. when
the source and target belong to different threads.
Relaxed or safe We model the scenario of reads occurring in advance, as described at the beginning
of this section, by some subrelation of the read-from rf being relaxed, i.e. not included in global happens
before. When a thread can read from its own store buffer [AG95] (the typical TSO/x86 scenario), we relax
the internal read-from, that is, rf where source and target belong to the same thread. When two threads T0
and T1 can communicate privately via a cache (a case of write atomicity relaxation [AG95]), we relax the
SC x86 Power
poWR yes mfence sync
poWW yes yes sync, lwsync
poRW yes yes sync, lwsync, dp
poRR yes yes sync, lwsync, dp, branch;isync
Fig. 5: ppo and fences per architecture
5
external read-from rfe, and call the corresponding write non-atomic. This is the main particularity of Power
and ARM, and cannot happen on TSO/x86. Some program-order pairs may be relaxed (e.g. write-read pairs
on x86, and all but dp ones on Power), i.e. only a subset of po is guaranteed to occur in order. This subset
constitutes the preserved program order, ppo. When a relation must not be relaxed on a given architecture,
we call it safe.
Fig. 5 summarises ppo per architecture. The columns are architectures, e.g. x86, and the lines are
relations, e.g. poWR. We write e.g. poWR for the program order between a write and a read. We write “yes”
when the relation is in the ppo of the architecture: e.g. poWR is in the ppo of SC. When we write something
else, typically the name of a fence, e.g. mfence, the relation is not in the ppo of the architecture (e.g. poWR
is not in the ppo of x86), and the fence can restore the ordering: e.g. mfence maintains write-read pairs in
program order.
Following [AMSS10], the relation fence (with fence ⊆ po) induced by a fence is non-cumulative when it
only orders certain pairs of events surrounding the fence. The relation fence is cumulative when it additionally
makes writes atomic, e.g. by flushing caches. In our model, this amounts to making sequences of external
read-from and fences (rfe; fence or fence; rfe) safe, even though rfe alone would not be safe. In Fig. 4, placing
a cumulative fence between the two writes on T0 will not only prevent their reordering, but also enforce an
ordering between the write (a) on T0 and the read (c) on T1, which reads from T0.
Architectures An architecture A determines the set safeA of relations safe on A. Following [AMSS10], we
always consider the coherence co, the from-read relation fr and the fences to be safe. SC relaxes nothing, i.e.
rf and po are safe. TSO authorises the reordering of write-read pairs and store buffering but nothing else.
Critical cycles Following [SS88, AM11], for an architecture A, a delay is a po or rf edge that is not safe
(i.e. is relaxed) on A. An execution (E,X) is valid on A yet not on SC iff it contains critical cycles [AM11].
Formally, a critical cycle w.r.t. A is a cycle in po ∪ com, where com , co ∪ rf ∪ fr is the communication
relation, which has the following characteristics (the last two ensure the minimality of the critical cycles):
(1) the cycle contains at least one delay for A; (2) per thread, (i) there are at most two accesses a and b, and
(ii) they access distinct memory locations; and (3) for a memory location ℓ, there are at most three accesses
to ℓ along the cycle, which belong to distinct threads.
Fig. 4 shows a critical cycle w.r.t. Power. The po edge on T0, the po edge on T1, and the rf edge between
T0 and T1, are all unsafe on Power. On the other hand, the cycle in Fig. 4 does not contain a delay w.r.t.
TSO, and is thus not a critical cycle on TSO.
To forbid executions containing critical cycles, one can insert fences into the program to prevent delays.
To prevent a po delay, a fence can be inserted between the two accesses forming the delay, following Fig. 5.
To prevent an rf delay, a cumulative fence must be used (see Sec. 6 for details). For the example in Fig. 4,
for Power, we need to place a cumulative fence between the two writes on T0, preventing both the po and
the adjacent rf edge from being relaxed, and use a dependency or fence to prevent the po edge on T1 from
being relaxed.
5 Static detection of critical cycles
We want to synthesise fences to prevent weak behaviours and thus restore SC. We explained in Sec. 4 that
we should place fences along the critical cycles of the program executions. To find the critical cycles, we look
for cycles in an over-approximation of all the executions of the program. We hence avoid enumeration of all
traces, which would hinder scalability, and get all the critical cycles of all program executions at once. Thus
we can find all fences preventing the critical cycles corresponding to two executions in one step, instead of
examining the two executions separately.
To analyse a C program, e.g. on the left-hand side of Fig. 6, we convert it to a goto-program (right-hand
side of Fig. 6), the internal representation of the CProver framework; we refer to http://www.cprover.org/
goto-cc for details. The pointer analysis we use is a standard concurrent points-to analysis that we have
shown to be sound for our weak memory models in earlier work [AKL+11]. We explain in details how we
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void thread 1( int input)
{
int r1 ;
x = input;
if (rand()%2)
y = 1;
else
r1 = z;
x = 1;
}
void thread 2()
{
int r2 , r3 , r4 ;
r2 = y;
r3 = z;
r4 = x;
}
thread 1
int r1 ;
x = input;
Bool tmp;
tmp = rand();
[! tmp%2] goto 1;
y = 1;
goto 2;
1: r1 = z;
2: x = 1;
end function
thread 2
int r2 , r3 , r4 ;
r2 = y;
r3 = z;
r4 = x;
end function
Fig. 6: A C program (left) and its goto-program (right)
handle pointers at the end of this section. The C program in Fig. 6 features two threads which can interfere.
The first thread writes the argument “input” to x, then randomly writes 1 to y or reads z, and then writes
1 to x. The second thread successively reads y, z and x. In the corresponding goto-program, the if-else
structure has been transformed into a guard with the condition of the if followed by a goto construct. From
the goto-program, we then compute an abstract event graph (aeg), shown in Fig. 7(a). The events a, b1, b2
and c (resp. d, e and f) correspond to thread1 (resp. thread2) in Fig. 6. We only consider accesses to shared
variables, and ignore the local variables. We finally explore the aeg to find the potential critical cycles.
An aeg represents all the executions of a program (in the sense of Sec. 4). Fig. 7(b) and (c) give two
executions associated with the aeg shown in Fig. 7(a). For readability, the transitive po edges have been
omitted (e.g. between the two events d′ and f ′). The concrete events that occur in an execution are shown
in bold. In an aeg, the events do not have concrete values, whereas in an execution they do. Also, an aeg
merely indicates that two accesses to the same variable could form a data race (see the competing pairs
(cmp) relation in Fig. 7(a), which is a symmetric relation), whereas an execution has oriented relations
(e.g. indicating the write that a read takes its value from, see e.g. the rf arrow in Fig. 7(b) and (c)). The
execution in Fig. 7(b) has a critical cycle (with respect to e.g. Power) between the events a′, b′2, d
′, and f ′.
The execution in Fig. 7(c) does not have a critical cycle.
We build an aeg essentially as in [AKNT13]. However, our goal and theirs are not the same: they
instrument an input program to reuse SC verification tools to perform weak memory verification, whereas
we are interested in automatic fence placement. Moreover, the work of [AKNT13] did not present a semantics
of goto-programs in terms of aegs, which we do in this section.
Constructing aegs For each goto-program(e.g. bottom of Fig. 6),we build an aeg , (Es, pos, cmp) as
follows (see Fig. 7(a)), with the abstract events Es, the static program order pos and the competing pairs
cmp. Given an aeg G, we write respectively G.Es, G.pos and G. cmp for the abstract events, the static
program order and the competing pairs of G.
(a)Wx
(b1)Wy
(c)Wx
(d)Ry
(e)Rz
(f)Rx
(b2)Rz
pospos
pospos
pos
pos
cmp
cmp
cmp
(a′)Wx1
(b′1)Wy1
(c′)Wx1
(d′)Ry1
(e′)Rz0
(f ′)Rx0
(b′2)Rz
po
po
po
pofr
rf
fr
co
(a′′)Wx2
(b′′1)Wy
(c′′)Wx1
(d′′)Ry0
(e′′)Rz0
(f ′′)Rx1
(b′′2)Rz0
po
po
po
po
rf
co
(a) aeg of Fig. 6 (b) ex. with critical cycle (c) ex. without critical cycle
Fig. 7: The aeg of Fig. 6 and two executions corresponding to it
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(1) assignment: lhs=rhs; i
τ [lhs = rhs; i](aeg) = τ [i]((aeg.Es ∪ evts(lhs) ∪
evts(rhs), aeg.pos ∪ end(aeg.pos) × (evts(rhs) ∪
evts(lhs)\trg(lhs)) ∪ (evts(rhs) ∪ evts(lhs)\trg(lhs)) ×
trg(lhs), aeg. cmp))
R
evts(rhs)
R
evts(lhs)\trg(lhs)
W
trg(lhs)
τ [i]
pos
pos
pos
pos
pos
(2) function call: fun(); i
τ [fun(); i] = τ [i] ◦ τ [body(fun)] τ [body(f)] τ [i]
pos pos
(3) guard: [expr] i1; i2
τ [[guard]i1; i2](aeg) = let guarded= τ [i1](aeg) in τ [i2]((aeg.Es∪
guarded.Es, aeg.pos ∪ guarded.pos, aeg. cmp))
τ [i1] τ [i2]
pos pos
pos
(4) forward jump: goto l;
τ [goto l; i] = τ [follow(l)] τ [follow(l)]
pos
(5) backward jump: l: i1; [cond] goto l; i2
τ [l : i1; [cond]goto l; i2](aeg) = let local= τ [i1](aeg) in
τ [i2]((aeg.Es ∪ local.Es, aeg.pos ∪ local.pos ∪ end(local.pos) ×
begin(local.pos), aeg. cmp))
τ [i1] τ [i2]
pos pos
pos
(6) assume / assert / skip: assume(φ); i / assert(φ); i / skip; i
τ [assume(φ); i] = τ [i] τ [i]
pos
(7) atomic section: atomic begin; i1; atomic end; i2
τ [atomic start; i1; atomic end; i2](aeg) = let
section=τ [i1]((aeg.Es, aeg.pos ∪ end(aeg.pos) × {f}, aeg. cmp))
in τ [i2]((section.Es, section.pos ∪ end(section.pos) ×
{f}, section. cmp))
f τ [i1] f τ [i2]
pos pos pos
pos
pos
(8) new thread: start thread th; i
τ [start thread th; i](aeg) = let local=τ [body(th)](∅¯)
and main=τ [i](aeg) and inter=τ [i](∅¯) in (local.Es ∪
main.Es, local.pos ∪main.pos, local.Es ⊗ inter.Es)
τ [body(f)]τ [i]
pos cmp
(9) end of thread: end thread;
τ [end thread](aeg) = aeg ∅
Fig. 8: Operations to create the aeg of a goto-program
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An abstract event represents all events with same program point, memory location and direction (write
or read). In Fig. 7(a), (a)Wx abstracts the events (a′)Wx1 and (a′′)Wx2 in the executions of Fig. 7(b) and
(c).
The static program order pos abstracts all the (dynamic) po edges that connect two events in program
order and that cannot be decomposed as a succession of po edges in this execution. We write po+s (resp.
po∗s) for the transitive (resp. reflexive transitive) closure of this relation.
The competing pairs cmp over-approximate the external communications coe ∪ rfe ∪ fre. In Fig. 7(a),
the cmp edges (a, f), (b1, d), and (c, f) abstract in particular the fre edges (f
′, c′) and (f ′, a′), and the rfe
edge (b′1, d
′) in Fig. 7(b). We do not need to represent internal communications as they are already covered
by po+s . The cmp construction is similar to the first steps of static data race detections (see [KSKZ09, Sec.
5]), where shared variables involved in write-read or write-write communications are collected.
To build the aeg , we define a semantics of goto-programs in terms of abstract events, static program
order and competing pairs. We detail below this semantics for each goto-statement. Each of these cases
is accompanied in Fig. 8 by a graphical representation summarising the aeg construction on the right-hand
side, and a formal definition of the semantics on the left-hand side. In Fig. 8, we write τ [i] to represent
the semantics of a goto-instruction i. Other notations, e.g. follow(f) or body(f), are explained below. We
do not compute the values of our variables, and thus do not interpret the expressions. In Fig. 7(a), (a)Wx
represents the assignment “x = input” in thread 1 in Fig. 6 (since “input” is a local variable). This abstracts
the values that “input” could hold, e.g. 1 (see (a′)Wx1 in Fig. 7(b)) or 2 (see (a′′)Wx2 in Fig. 7(c)). Prior
to building the aeg, we copy expressions of conditions or function arguments into local variables. Thus all
the work over shared variables is handled in the assignment case.
We now present the construction of the aeg starting with the intra-thread instructions (e.g. assignments,
function calls), creating pos edges, then the thread constructor, creating cmp edges.
Assignments lhs=rhs We decompose this statement into sets of abstract events: the reads from shared
variables in rhs and lhs, denoted by evts(rhs) and evts(lhs), and the writes to the potential target objects
trg(lhs) (determined from lhs as explained below). We do not assume any order in the evaluation of the
variables in an expression. Hence, we connect to the incoming pos all the reads of rhs and all the reads
of lhs except trg(lhs). We then connect each of them to the potential target writes to trg(lhs). This is
the set of objects (in the C sense [c1111]) that could be written to, according to our pointer analysis. They
are either fields of structures, structures, arrays (independent of their offsets) or variables. If we have e.g.
*(&t+y+r)=z+3 (where t, y and z are shared), t is our target variable, and we obtain (Ry,Wt) ∈ pos and
(Rz,Wt) ∈ pos. We also maintain a map from local to shared variables, to record the data and address
dependencies between abstract events.
Procedure calls fun() We build the pos corresponding to the function’s body (written body(fun)) once
and for all. We then replace the call to a function fun() by its body. This ensures a better precision, in the
sense that a function can be fenced in a given context and unfenced in another.
Guarded statement We do not keep track of the values of the variables at each program point. Thus
we cannot evaluate the guard of a statement. Hence, we abstract the guard and make this statement
non-deterministically reachable, by adding a second pos edge, bypassing the statement.
Forward jump to a label L We connect the previous abstract events to the next abstract events that we
generate from the program point L. In Fig. 8, we write follow(L) for the sequence of statements following
the label L.
Backward jump (unbounded loops), i.e., a jump to a label already visited. We connect the last abstract
event of the copy to the first abstract event of the original body with a pos edge. In Fig. 8, begin(S) and
end(S) are respectively the sets of the first and last abstract events of the pos sub-graph S.
Assumption Similarly to the guarded statement, as we cannot evaluate the condition, we abstract the
assumptions by bypassing them.
Atomic sections are special goto-instructions, for modelling idealised atomic sections without having
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(a)Wt[i]
(b)Rt[0]
(c)Rt[1]
pos
pos
.
(a′1)Wt[0](a
′
2)Wt[1]...(a
′
n)Wt[n]
.
(b′)Rt[0]
(c′)Rt[1]
pospospos
pospospos
pos
pos
cmp
cmp
(a) aeg following directly the cfg (b) aeg with a precise p.a.
(a′′1 )Wt[*]
(a′′2 )Wt[*]
(b′′)Rt[0]
(c′′)Rt[1]
pos poscmpcmp
cmp
cmp (a
′′′
1 )W*
(a′′′2 )W*
(b′′′)Rt[0]
(c′′′)Rt[1]
cmp
cmp
cmp
cmp
pos pos
(c) aeg with an index-insensitive p.a. (d) aeg with an imprecise p.a.
Fig. 9: Construction of aeg for dynamic cycles w.r.t. pointer analysis (p.a.) precision
to rely on the correctness of their implementation. These are used in many theoretical concurrency and
verification works. For example, we use them (see Sec. 7) for copying data to atomic structures, as in e.g.
our implementation of the Chase-Lev queue [CL05]. Reorderings cannot happen across an atomic section,
thus we place two full fences f right after the beginning of the section and just before the end of section.
Construction of cmp During the construction of pos, we also compute the competing pairs that abstract
external communications between threads. For each write w to a memory location x, we augment the
cmp relation with pairs made of this write and any write to x from an interfering thread: this abstracts the
coherence coe. Similarly, we augment cmp with pairs made of w and any read of x from an interfering thread.
Symmetrically, for each read r of y, we add pairs made of r and any write to y from an interfering thread to
cmp. This abstracts the from-read fre and read-from rfe relations. In Fig. 8, we use ⊗ to construct the cmp
edges when encountering a new interfering thread spawned, that is, when the goto-instruction start thread
is met. We define ⊗ as A ⊗ B = {(x, y)|(x, y) ∈ A × B s.t. write(x) ∨ write(y)}. ∅¯ stands for the triplet
(∅, ∅, ∅).
Interplay with pointer analyses We explain how to deal with the varying imprecision of pointer analyses
in a sound way. We want to find all critical cycles in the static aeg. Yet, some cycles might reveal themselves
only dynamically, e.g., across several iterations of a same loop. Fig. 9a gives an aeg for a two-thread program,
where the first thread loops and writes to a shared array t and the second thread reads from this array.
This program could exhibit a message passing pattern (see Fig. 4), where writes in the loop could be
reordered. If we build our aeg following the cfg, we obtain one abstract event for all writes of the loop. How
we address this depends on the precision of our pointer analysis.
If we have a precise pointer analysis, we insert as many abstract events as required for the objects pointed
to, as in Fig. 9b. Otherwise, we underspecify the abstract event: in Fig. 9c, we abstract Wt[i] by Wt[*].
We then replicate the body of the loop, hence the two Wt[*] in pos. They abstract any two writes to
distinct places in t that could occur across the iterations, as required by (2.i) and (2.ii) above. Our tool
musketeer implements this method.
If the analysis cannot determine the location of an access, we insert an abstract event accessing any
shared variable, as in Fig. 9d. This event can communicate with any variable accessed in other threads.
Cycle detection Once we have the aeg, we enumerate (using Tarjan’s algorithm [Tar73]) its potential
critical cycles by searching for cycles that contain at least one edge that is a delay, as defined in Sec. 4.
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pos pos
pos
pos
pos
pos pos
dpcycle 1
lwf
cycle 3
dp
cycle 2
f
cycle 4
(c)Rz
(d)Wx
(e)Rx
(f)Ry (i)Rz
(j)Wy(a)Wt
(b)Wy (h)Rt
(g)Wz
(l)Rz
(k)Wt
min dp(e,g) + dp(f,h) + dp(f,g) + 3 · (f(e,f) + f(f,g) + f(g,h)) + 2 · (lwf(e,f) + lwf(f,g) + lwf(g,h))
s.t. cycle 1, delay (e, g): dp(e,g) + f(e,f) + f(f,g) + lwf(e,f) + lwf(f,g) ≥ 1
cycle 2, delay (f, g): dp(f,g) + f(f,g) + lwf(f,g) ≥ 1
cycle 3, delay (f, h): dp(f,h) + f(f,g) + f(g,h) + lwf(f,g) + lwf(g,h) ≥ 1
cycle 4, delay (g, h): f(g,h) ≥ 1
Fig. 10: Example of resolution with between
6 Synthesis
In Fig. 10, we have an aeg with five threads: {a, b}, {c, d}, {e, f, g, h}, {i, j} and {k, l}. Each node is an
abstract event computed as in the previous section. The dashed edges represent the pos between abstract
events in the same thread. The full lines represent the edges involved in a cycle. Thus the aeg of Fig. 10 has
four potential critical cycles. We derive the set of constraints in a process we define later in this section. We
now have a set of cycles to forbid by placing fences. Moreover, we want to optimise the placement of the
fences.
Challenges If there is only one type of fence (as in TSO, which only features mfence), optimising only
consists of placing a minimal amount of fences to forbid as many cycles as possible. For example, placing
a full fence sync between f and g in Fig. 10 might forbid cycles 1, 2 and 3 under Power, whereas placing it
somewhere else might forbid at best two amongst them.
Since we handle several types of fences for a given architecture (e.g. dependencies, lwsync and sync on
Power), we can also assign some cost to each of them. For example, following the folklore, a dependency
is less costly than an lwsync, which is itself less costly than a sync. Given these costs, one might want to
minimise their sum along different executions: to forbid cycles 1, 2 and 3 in Fig. 10, a single lwsync between
f and g can be cheaper at runtime than three dependencies respectively between e and g, f and g, and f
and h. However, if we had only cycles 1 and 2, the dependencies would be cheaper. We see that we have to
optimise both the placement and the type of fences at the same time.
We model our problem as an integer linear program (ILP) (see Fig. 11), which we explain in this section.
Solving our ILP gives us a set of fences to insert to forbid the cycles. This set of fences is optimal in that it
minimises the cost function. More precisely, the constraints are the cycles to forbid, each variable represents
a fence to insert, and the cost function sums the cost of all fences.
6.1 Cost function of the ILP
We handle several types of fences: full (f), lightweight (lwf), control fences (cf), and dependencies (dp). On
Power, the full fence is sync, the lightweight one lwsync. We write T for the set {dp, f, cf, lwf}. We assume
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Input: aeg (Es,pos,cmp) and potential critical cycles C = {C1, ..., Cn}
Problem: minimise
∑
(l,t)∈potential-places(C) tl × cost(t)
Constraints: for all d ∈ delays(C)
(* for TSO, PSO, RMO, Power *)
if d ∈ poWR then
∑
e∈between(d) fe ≥ 1
if d ∈ poWW then
∑
e∈between(d) fe + lwfe ≥ 1
if d ∈ poRW then dpd +
∑
e∈between(d) fe + lwfe ≥ 1
if d ∈ poRR then dpd +
∑
e∈between(d) fe + lwfe +
∑
e∈ctrl(d) cfe ≥ 1
(* for Power *)
if d ∈ cmp then
∑
e∈cumul(d) fe +
∑
e∈cumul(d)∩¬poWR∩¬poRW lwfe ≥ 1
Output: the set actual-places(C) of pairs (l, t) s.t. tl is set to 1 in the ILP solution
Fig. 11: ILP for inferring fence placements
that each type of fence has an a priori cost (e.g. a dependency is cheaper than a full fence), regardless of
its location in the code. We write cost(t) for t ∈ T for this cost.
We take as input the aeg of our program and the potential critical cycles to fence. We define two sets of
pairs (l, t) where l is a pos edge of the aeg and t a type of fence. We introduce an ILP variable tl (in {0, 1})
for each pair (l, t).
The set potential-places is the set of such pairs that can be inserted into the program to forbid the cycles.
The set actual-places is the set of such pairs that have been set to 1 by our ILP. We output this set, as it
represents the locations in the code in need of a fence and the type of fence to insert for each of them. We
also output the total cost of all these insertions, i.e.
∑
(l,t)∈potential-places(C) tl × cost(t). The solver should
minimise this sum whilst satisfying the constraints.
6.2 Constraints in the ILP
We want to forbid all the cycles in the set that we are given after filtering, as explained in the preamble of
this section. This requires placing an appropriate fence on each delay for each cycle in this set. Different
delay pairs might need different fences, depending e.g. on the directions (write or read) of their extremities.
Essentially, we follow the table in Fig. 5. For example, a write-read pair needs a full fence (e.g. mfence on
x86, or sync on Power). A read-read pair can use anything amongst dependencies and fences. Our constraints
ensure that we use the right type of fence for each delay pair.
Inequalities as constraints We first assume that all the program order delays are in pos and we ignore
Power and ARM special features (dependencies, control fences and communication delays). This case deals
with relatively strong models, ranging from TSO to RMO. We relax these assumptions below.
In this setting, potential-places(C) is the set of all the pos delays of the cycles in C. We ensure that every
delay pair for every execution is fenced, by placing a fence on the static pos edge for this pair, and this for
each cycle given as input. Thus, we need at least one constraint per static delay pair d in each cycle.
If d is of the form poWR, as (g, h) in Fig. 10 (cycle 4), only a full fence can fix it (cf. Fig. 5), thus we
impose fd ≥ 1. If d is of the form poRR, as (f, h) in Fig. 10 (cycle 3), we can choose any type of fence,
i.e. dpd + cfd + lwfd + fd ≥ 1.
Our constraints cannot be equalities because it is not certain that the resulting system would be satisfiable.
To see this, suppose our constraints were equalities, and consider Fig. 10 limited to cycles 2, 3 and 4. Using
only full fences, lightweight fences, and dependencies (i.e. ignoring control fences for now), we would generate
the constraints (i) lwf(f,g) + f(f,g) = 1 for the delay (f, g) in cycle 2, (ii) dp(f,h) + lwf(f,h) + f(f,h) + lwf(g,h) +
f(g,h) = 1 for the delay (f, h) in cycle 3, and (iii) f(g,h) = 1 for the delay (g, h) in cycle 4.
Preventing the delay (g, h) in cycle 4 requires a full fence, thus f(g,h) = 1. By the constraint (ii), and
since f(g,h) = 1, we derive f(f,g) = 0 and lwf(f,g) = 0. But these two equalities are not possible given the
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constraint (i). By using inequalities, we allow several fences to live on the same edge. In fact, the constraints
only ensure the soundness; the optimality is fully determined by the cost function to minimise.
Delays are in fact in po+s , not always in pos: in Fig. 10, the delay (e, g) in cycle 1 does not belong to
pos but to po
+
s . Thus given a po
+
s delay (x, y), we consider all the pos pairs which appear between x and
y, i.e.: between(x, y) , {(e1, e2) ∈ pos | (x, e1) ∈ po∗s ∧ (e2, y) ∈ po
∗
s}. For example in Fig. 10, we have
between(e, g) = {(e, f), (f, g)}. Thus, ignoring the use of dependencies and control fences for now, for the
delay (e, g) in Fig. 10, we will not impose f(e,g) + lwf(e,g) ≥ 1 but rather f(e,f) + lwf(e,f) + f(f,g) + lwf(f,g) ≥ 1.
Indeed, a full fence or a lightweight fence in (e, f) or (f, g) will prevent the delay in (e, g).
Dependencies need more care, as they cannot necessarily be placed anywhere between e and g (in the
formal sense of between(e, g)): dp(e,f) or dp(f,g) would not fix the delay (e, g), but simply maintain the pairs
(e, f) or (f, g), leaving the pair (e, g) free to be reordered. Thus if we choose to synchronise (e, g) using
dependencies, we actually need a dependency from e to g: dp(e,g). Dependencies only apply to pairs that
start with a read; thus for each such pair (see the poRW and poRR cases in Fig. 11), we add a variable for
the dependency: (e, g) will be fixed with the constraint dp(e,g) + f(e,f) + lwf(e,f) + f(f,g) + lwf(f,g) ≥ 1.
Control fences placed after a conditional branch (e.g. bne on Power) prevent speculative reads after this
branch (see Fig. 5). Thus, when building the aeg, we built a set poC for each branch, which gathers all the
pairs of abstract events such that the first one is the last event before a branch, and the second is the first
event after that branch. We can place a control fence before the second component of each such pair, if the
second component is a read. Thus, we add cfe as a possible variable to the constraint for read-read pairs
(see poRR case in Fig. 11, where ctrl(d) = between(d) ∩ poC).
Cumulativity For architectures like Power, where stores are non-atomic, we need to look for program
order pairs that are connected to an external read-from (e.g. (c, d) in Fig. 4 has an rf connected to it via
event c). In such cases, we need to use a cumulative fence, e.g. lwsync or sync, and not, for example, a
dependency.
The locations to consider in such cases are: before (in pos) the write w of the rfe, or after (in pos)
the read r of the rfe, i.e. cumul(w, r) = {(e1, e2) | (e1, e2) ∈ pos ∧ ((e2, w) ∈ po∗s ∨ (r, e1) ∈ po
∗
s)}. In
Fig. 10 (cycle 2), (g, i) over-approximates an rfe edge, and the edges where we can insert fences are in
cumul(g, i) = {(f, g), (i, j)}.
We need a cumulative fence as soon as there is a potential rfe, even if the adjacent pos pairs do not form a
delay. For example in Fig. 4, suppose there is a dependency between the reads on T1, and a fence maintaining
write-write pairs on T0. In that case we need to place a cumulative fence to fix the rfe, even if the two pos
pairs are themselves fixed. Thus, we quantify over all pos pairs when we need to place cumulative fences. As
only f and lwf are cumulative, we have potential-places(C) , {(l, t) | (t ∈ {dp} ∧ l ∈ delays(C)) ∨(t ∈ T\{dp}
∧ l ∈
⋃
d∈delays(C) between(d)) ∨(t ∈ {f, lwf} ∧ l ∈ pos(C))}.
6.3 Comparison with trencher
(a)Wx
(b)Ry
(c)Wy
(e)(d) (f)
(g)Rx
f
pos
pos
cmp
cmp
Fig. 12: Cycles sharing the edge (a, b)
We illustrate the difference between trencher [BDM13]
and our approach using Fig. 12. There are three cycles
that share the edge (a, b). They differ in the path taken
between nodes c and g. Suppose that the user has in-
serted a full fence between a and b. To forbid the three
cycles, we need to fence the thread on the right.
The trencher algorithm first calculates which pairs can
be reordered: in our example, these are (c, g) via d, (c, g)
via e and (c, g) via f . It then determines at which loca-
tions a fence could be placed. In our example, there are
13
classic fast
Dek Pet Lam Szy Par Cil CL Fif Lif Anc Har
LoC 50 37 72 54 96 97 111 150 152 188 179
dfence – – – – – – – – – – 7.8 3 6.2 3 ∼ 0 ∼ 0 ∼ 0 ∼ 0
memorax 0.4 2 1.4 2 79.1 4 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
musketeer 0.0 5 0.0 3 0.0 8 0.0 8 0.0 3 0.0 3 0.0 1 0.1 1 0.0 1 0.1 1 0.6 4
offence 0.0 2 0.0 2 0.0 8 0.0 8 – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
pensieve 0.0 16 0.0 6 0.0 24 0.0 22 0.0 7 0.0 14 0.0 8 0.1 33 0.0 29 0.0 44 0.1 72
remmex 0.5 2 0.5 2 2.0 4 1.8 5 – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
trencher 1.6 2 1.3 2 1.7 4 – – 0.5 1 8.6 3 – – – – – – – – – –
Fig. 13: All tools on the classic and fast series for TSO
6 options: (c, d), (d, g), (c, e), (e, g), (c, f), and (f, g). The encoding thus uses 6 variables for the fence
locations. The algorithm then gathers all the irreducible sets of locations to be fenced to forbid the delay
between c and g, where “irreducible” means that removing any of the fences would prevent this set from
fully fixing the delay. As all the paths that connect c and g have to be covered, trencher needs to collect all
the combinations of one fence per path. There are 2 locations per path, leading to 23 sets. Consequently, as
stated in [BDM13], trencher needs to construct an exponential number of sets.
Each set is encoded in the ILP with one variable. For this example, trencher thus uses 6 + 8 variables. It
also generates one constraint per delay (here, 1) to force the solver to pick a set, and 8 constraints to enforce
that all the location variables are set to 1 if the set containing these locations is picked.
By contrast, musketeer only needs 6 variables: the possible locations for fences. We detect three cycles,
and generate only three constraints to fix the delay. Thus, on a parametric version of the example, trencher’s
ILP grows exponentially whereas musketeer’s is linear-sized.
7 Implementation, Experiments and Impact
We implemented our new method, in addition to all the methods described in Sec. 2, in our tool musketeer,
using glpk (http://www.gnu.org/software/glpk) as the ILP solver. musketeer is a completely automated source-to-
source transformation for concurrent C program. Once the locations and types of fences have been inferred,
the insertion in the source itself is performed by a script. This step is relatively straightforward for memory
fences. Inserting dependencies in C is more challenging, due to the multiple optimisations that the compiler
will perform. We explain how we address this issue in Sec. 7.1.
We compare our method and the methods we reimplemented to the existing tools listed in Sec. 3 on
classic examples from literature and some Debian executables in Sec. 7.2. We finally check the impact on
runtime of the fences inferred and inserted in memcached, a Debian executable of about 10000 lines of code.
7.1 Inserting synchronisation in practice
Given an aeg, we return the static program order edges where we should place a fence to forbid the critical
cycles. Then we have some freedom for the fence placement in the actual code. Consider e.g. the program
on the left of Fig. 14. The corresponding aeg is (Rx,Ry) ∈ pos. To fence this edge, we can place a fence
either as in the middle or as on the right of Fig. 14, namely just after the first component of a delay pair,
or just before the last. Our tool offers these two options. We next illustrate how we concretely insert fences
r1 = x;
r2 = r1+2;
r3 = y;
r1 = x;
asm (”mfence”);
r2 = r1+2;
r3 = y;
r1 = x;
r2 = r1+2;
asm (”mfence”);
r3 = y;
Fig. 14: Choices for placing a fence.
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void∗ t0(void∗ arg) {
int r1;
while(x);
asm volatile (”isb”);
r1 = y;
}
t0:
ldr r2 ,. L5
.L2:
ldr r3 ,[ r2,#0]
cmp r3,#0
bne .L2
isb
ldr r3 ,. L5+4
ldr r3 ,[ r3,#0]
bx lr
.L5:
Fig. 15: isb.c and isb-O3.s.
and dependencies in a piece of C code.
Fences are all handled the same way; we simply inline an assembly fence. For example, for a read-read
pair separated by a branch (lines 3 and 5 in Fig. 15 on the left), we can insert a control fence, e.g. isb on
ARM. The compiler keeps the fence in place, as one can see in the compiled code in Fig. 15 on the right.
The while loop (including the read of x) is implemented by lines 3 to 6, then comes the isb (line 7), and the
read of y corresponds to lines 8 and 9.
Dependencies require us to rewrite the code. Consider a read-read pair, corresponding to lines 3 and
9 on the left of Fig. 16. We enforce an address dependency from the read of x to the read of y, by using
a register (r3) to perform some computation which always returns 0 (in this case XOR-ing a register with
itself), then add this result to the address of y. Again, the compiler does not optimise this dependency (see
lines 4 to 8 on the right of Fig. 16).
7.2 Experiments and benchmarks
Our tool analyses C programs. dfence also handles C code, but requires some high-level specification for each
program, which was not available to us. memorax works on a process-based language that is specific to the
tool. offence works on a subset of assembler for x86, ARM and Power. pensieve originally handled Java, but
we did not have access to it and have therefore re-implemented the method. remmex handles Promela-like
programs. trencher analyses transition systems. Most of the tools come with some of the benchmarks in
their own languages; not all benchmarks were however available for each tool. We have re-implemented some
of the benchmarks for offence.
We now detail our experiments. classic and fast gather examples from the literature and related work.
The debian benchmarks are packages of Debian Linux 7.1. classic and fast were run on a x86-64 Intel
void∗ t0(void∗ arg) {
int r1, r2;
r1=x;
int r3;
asm volatile (
”eors %0, %1, %1”
:”=r”(r3)
:”r”(r1 ));
r2=∗(&y+r3);
}
t0:
movw r3,#:lower16:x
movt r3,#:upper16:x
ldr r2 ,[ r3, #0]
eors r2, r2,r2
movw r3,#:lower16:y
movt r3,#:upper16:y
ldr r3 ,[ r3,r2, lsl #2]
bx lr
Fig. 16: addr.c and addr-O3.s.
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TSO Power
LoC nodes fences time fences time
memcached 9944 694 3 13.9s 70 89.9s
lingot 2894 183 0 5.3s 5 5.3s
weborf 2097 73 0 0.7s 0 0.7s
timemachine 1336 129 2 0.8s 16 0.8s
see 2626 171 0 1.4s 0 1.5s
blktrace 1567 615 0 6.5s – timeout
ptunnel 1249 1867 2 95.0s – timeout
proxsmtpd 2024 10 0 0.1s 0 0.1s
ghostess 2684 1106 0 25.9s 0 25.9s
dnshistory 1516 1466 1 29.4s 9 64.9s
Fig. 17: musketeer on selected benchmarks in debian series for TSO and Power
Core2 Quad Q9550 machine with 4 cores (2.83GHz) and 4GB of RAM. debian was run on a x86-64 Intel
Core i5-3570 machine with 4 cores (3.40GHz) and 4GB of RAM.
classic consists of Dekker’s mutex (Dek) [Dij65]; Peterson’s mutex (Pet) [Pet81]; Lamport’s fast mutex
(Lam) [Lam87]; Szymanski’s mutex (Szy) [Szy88]; and Parker’s bug (Par) [Dic09]. We ran all tools in this
series for TSO (the model common to all). For each example, Fig. 13 gives the number of fences inserted,
and the time (in sec) needed. When an example is not available in the input language of a tool, we write
“–”. The first four tools place fences to enforce stability/robustness [AM11, BMM11]; the last three to
satisfy a given safety property. We used memorax with the option -o1, to compute one maximal permissive
set and not all. For remmex on Szymanski, we give the number of fences found by default (which may be
non-optimal). Its “maximal permissive” option lowers the number to 2, at the cost of a slow enumeration.
As expected, musketeer is less precise than most tools, but outperforms all of them.
fast gathers Cil, Cilk 5 Work Stealing Queue (WSQ) [FLR98]; CL, Chase-Lev WSQ [CL05]; Fif, Michael
et al.’s FIFO WSQ [MVS09]; Lif, Michael et al.’s LIFO WSQ [MVS09]; Anc, Michael et al.’s Anchor
WSQ [MVS09]; Har, Harris’ set [DFG+00]. For each example and tool, Fig. 13 gives the number of fences
inserted (under TSO) and the time needed to do so. For dfence, we used the setting of [LNP+12]: the tool
has up to 20 attempts to find fences. We were unable to apply dfence on some of the fast examples: we
thus reproduce the number of fences given in [LNP+12], and write ∼ for the time. We applied musketeer to
this series, for all architectures. The fencing times for TSO and Power are almost identical, except for the
largest example, namely Har (0.1 s vs 0.6 s).
debian gathers 374 executables. These are a subset of the goto-programs that have been built from
packages of Debian Linux 7.1 by Michael Tautschnig. A small excerpt of our results is given in Fig. 17.
The full data set, including a comparison with the methods from Sec. 2, is provided at http://www.cprover.
org/wmm/musketeer. For each program, we give the lines of code and number of nodes in the aeg. We used
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Fig. 18: Runtime overheads due to inserted fences in memcached for each strategy
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stack on x86 stack on ARM queue on x86 queue on ARM
(o) [9.757; 9.798] [11.291; 11.369] [11.947; 11.978] [20.441; 20.634]
(m) [9.818; 9.850] [11.316; 11.408] [12.067; 12.099] [20.687; 20.857]
(p) [10.077; 10.155] [11.995; 12.109] [13.339; 13.373] [22.035; 22.240]
(v) N/A [11.779; 11.834] N/A [21.334; 21.526]
(e) [11.316; 11.360] [13.071; 13.200] [13.949, 13.981] [22.722; 22.903]
(h) [12.286; 12.325] [14.676; 14.844] [14.941, 14.963] [25.468; 25.633]
Fig. 19: Confidence intervals for data structure experiments
musketeer on these programs to demonstrate its scalability and its ability to handle deployed code. Most
programs already contain fences or operations that imply them, such as compare-and-swaps or locks. Our
tool musketeer takes these fences into account and infers a set of additional fences sufficient to guarantee SC.
The largest program we handle is memcached (∼ 10000 LoC). Our tool needs 13.9 s to place fences for TSO,
and 89.9 s for Power. A more meaningful measure for the hardness of an instance is the number of nodes in
the aeg. For example, ptunnel has 1867 nodes and 1249 LoC. The fencing takes 95.0 s for TSO, but times
out for Power due to the number of cycles. Not all fences inferred by musketeer are necessary to enforce SC,
due to the imprecision introduced by the aeg abstraction. However, as Section 2 shows, the execution time
overhead of the program versions with fences inserted by musketeer is still very low.
7.3 Impact on runtime
We finally measure the impact of fences for the program memcached, running experiments that are similar to
those in Sec. 2. We built new versions of memcached according to the fencing strategies described in Sec. 2.
We used in particular the memtier benchmarking tool to generate a workload for the memcached daemon,
and killed the daemon after 60 s. Fig. 1 shows the mean overhead w.r.t. the original, unmodified program.
Unsurprisingly, adding a fence after every access to static or heap data has a significant performance
effect. Similarly, adding fences via an escape analysis is expensive, yielding overheads of up to 17.5%.
Amongst the approaches guaranteeing SC (i.e. all but v), the best results were achieved with our tool
musketeer. We again computed the confidence intervals to check the statistical significance in Fig. 19.
8 Conclusion
We introduced a novel method for deriving a set of fences, which we implemented in a new tool called
musketeer. We compared it to existing tools and observed that it outperforms them. We demonstrated on
our debian series that musketeer can handle deployed code, with a large potential for scalability.
Acknowledgements We thank Michael Tautschnig for the Debian binaries, Mohamed Faouzi Atig, Egor
Derevenetc, Carsten Fuhs, Alexander Linden, Roland Meyer, Tyler Sorensen, Martin Vechev, Eran Yahav
and our reviewers for their feedback. We thank Alexander Linden and Martin Vechev again for giving us
access to their tools.
References
[AAC+13] Parosh Aziz Abdulla, Mohamed Faouzi Atig, Yu-Fang Chen, Carl Leonardsson, and Ahmed
Rezine, Memorax, a precise and sound tool for automatic fence insertion under TSO, Tools
and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems (TACAS), LNCS, Springer, 2013,
pp. 530–536.
[AG95] S. V. Adve and K. Gharachorloo, Shared memory consistency models: A tutorial, IEEE Computer
29 (1995), no. 12, 66–76.
17
[AKL+11] Jade Alglave, Daniel Kroening, John Lugton, Vincent Nimal, and Michael Tautschnig, Soundness
of data flow analyses for weak memory models, Programming Languages and Systems (APLAS),
LNCS, vol. 7078, Springer, 2011, pp. 272–288.
[AKNT13] Jade Alglave, Daniel Kroening, Vincent Nimal, and Michael Tautschnig, Software verification
for weak memory via program transformation, European Symposium on Programming (ESOP),
2013.
[AM11] J. Alglave and L. Maranget, Stability in weak memory models, Computer Aided Verification
(CAV), LNCS, vol. 6806, Springer, 2011, pp. 50–66.
[AMSS10] J. Alglave, L. Maranget, S. Sarkar, and P. Sewell, Fences in weak memory models, Computer
Aided Verification (CAV), LNCS, vol. 6174, Springer, 2010, pp. 258–272.
[BDM13] Ahmed Bouajjani, Egor Derevenetc, and Roland Meyer, Checking and enforcing robustness
against TSO, European Symposium on Programming (ESOP), LNCS, vol. 7792, Springer, 2013,
pp. 533–553.
[BMM11] A. Bouajjani, R. Meyer, and E. Moehlmann, Deciding robustness against total store ordering,
Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP), LNCS, vol. 6756, Springer, 2011, pp. 428–440.
[c1111] Information technology – Programming languages – C, BS ISO/IEC 9899:2011, 2011.
[CL05] David Chase and Yossi Lev, Dynamic circular work-stealing deque, SPAA, ACM, 2005, pp. 21–28.
[DFG+00] David Detlefs, Christine H. Flood, Alex Garthwaite, Paul A. Martin, Nir Shavit, and Guy L.
Steele Jr., Even better DCAS-based concurrent deques, Distributed Computing (DISC), LNCS,
vol. 1914, Springer, 2000, pp. 59–73.
[Dic09] David Dice, November 2009.
[Dij65] Edsger W. Dijkstra, Solution of a problem in concurrent programming control, Commun. ACM
8 (1965), no. 9, 569.
[FLM03] Xing Fang, Jaejin Lee, and Samuel P. Midkiff, Automatic fence insertion for shared memory
multiprocessing, International Conference on Supercomputing (ICS), ACM, 2003, pp. 285–294.
[FLR98] Matteo Frigo, Charles E. Leiserson, and Keith H. Randall, The implementation of the Cilk-5
multithreaded language, PLDI, ACM, 1998, pp. 212–223.
[KSKZ09] Vineet Kahlon, Nishant Sinha, Erik Kruus, and Yun Zhang, Static data race detection for con-
current programs with asynchronous calls, FSE, 2009.
[KVY10] Michael Kuperstein, Martin T. Vechev, and Eran Yahav, Automatic inference of memory fences,
Formal Methods in Computer-Aided Design (FMCAD), IEEE, 2010, pp. 111–119.
[KVY11] , Partial-coherence abstractions for relaxed memory models, PLDI, 2011, pp. 187–198.
[KY96] Arvind Krishnamurthy and Katherine A. Yelick, Analyses and optimizations for shared address
space programs, J. Par. Dist. Comp. 38 (1996), no. 2.
[Lam79] L. Lamport, How to Make a Correct Multiprocess Program Execute Correctly on a Multiprocessor,
IEEE Trans. Comput. 46 (1979), no. 7.
[Lam87] Leslie Lamport, A fast mutual exclusion algorithm, ACM Trans. Comput. Syst. 5 (1987), no. 1.
[LNP+12] Feng Liu, Nayden Nedev, Nedyalko Prisadnikov, Martin T. Vechev, and Eran Yahav, Dynamic
synthesis for relaxed memory models, PLDI, ACM, 2012, pp. 429–440.
18
[LP01] J. Lee and D.A. Padua, Hiding relaxed memory consistency with a compiler, IEEE Transactions
on Computers 50 (2001), 824–833.
[LW13] Alexander Linden and Pierre Wolper, A verification-based approach to memory fence insertion
in PSO memory systems, Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems
(TACAS), LNCS, vol. 7795, Springer, 2013, pp. 339–353.
[MSM+11] Daniel Marino, Abhayendra Singh, Todd D. Millstein, Madanlal Musuvathi, and Satish Naray-
anasamy, A case for an SC-preserving compiler, PLDI, ACM, 2011, pp. 199–210.
[MVS09] Maged M. Michael, Martin T. Vechev, and Vijay A. Saraswat, Idempotent work stealing, Prin-
ciples and Practice of Parallel Programming (PPOPP), ACM, 2009, pp. 45–54.
[ND13] Brian Norris and Brian Demsky, CDSchecker: checking concurrent data structures written with
C/C++ atomics, Object Oriented Programming Systems Languages & Applications (OOPSLA),
2013, pp. 131–150.
[OSS09] S. Owens, S. Sarkar, and P. Sewell, A better x86 memory model: x86-TSO, Theorem Proving in
Higher Order Logics (TPHOLs), LNCS, vol. 5674, Springer, 2009, pp. 391–407.
[Pet81] Gary L. Peterson, Myths about the mutual exclusion problem, Inf. Process. Lett. 12 (1981), no. 3,
115–116.
[ppc09] Power isa version 2.06, 2009.
[SFW+05] Zehra Sura, Xing Fang, Chi-Leung Wong, Samuel P. Midkiff, Jaejin Lee, and David A. Padua,
Compiler techniques for high performance sequentially consistent Java programs, PPOPP, ACM,
2005, pp. 2–13.
[spa94] Sparc Architecture Manual Version 9, 1994.
[SS88] D. Shasha and M. Snir, Efficient and correct execution of parallel programs that share memory,
TOPLAS 10 (1988), no. 2, 282–312.
[Szy88] Boleslaw K. Szymanski, A simple solution to Lamport’s concurrent programming problem with
linear wait, ICS, 1988, pp. 621–626.
[Tar73] R. Tarjan, Enumeration of the elementary circuits of a directed graph, SIAM J. Comput. 2 (1973),
no. 3, 211–216.
[VZN11] Viktor Vafeiadis and Francesco Zappa Nardelli, Verifying fence elimination optimisations, Static
Analysis (SAS), LNCS, vol. 6887, Springer, 2011, pp. 146–162.
19
